Chinese PLA's Abilities in Integrated Joint Operations

2011-12-11 (China Military News cited from idsa.in and by Mandip Singh) -- In recent years the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing a series of transformations at various levels in keeping with its changed military doctrine which emphasises upon fighting `local wars under conditions of informationalisation`. These transformations are occurring in organisation, manpower, equipment, training and doctrine. Very little has emerged about the methods of war fighting in an environment of changed structures consequent to the implementation of RMA. Some inputs have been culled out from various exercises conducted by the PLA and a few reports and writings in the recent past. Here, an attempt has been made to assess the progress on planning and conduct of Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) by the PLA.
The change from Joint Operations (JO) to Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) came about in the post 2002 era when the PLA shifted the emphasis from local wars under hi-tech conditions to local wars under informationalised conditions.1 While JO laid emphasis on `joint ness` within the individual service with vertical linkages, the IJO looks at `joint ness` with other services and hence lays greater emphasis on horizontal linkages. In its unique military history since 1949, China has fought wars only on land 1950 in the Korean Peninsula, 1962 across the Himalayas with India, 1969 at the Ussuri River with USSR and 1979 with Vietnam across the mountains in the South. All these wars had very little contribution from the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and negligible contribution from the PLA Navy (PLAN). As a result, the PLA held sway on all matters military. In fact, the early concept of` jointness meant that during joint exercises various forces conducted separate tasks in proximity of each other. That has since changed. The first ! indicati ons of a serious attempt at Joint Operations came in 2004, when the CMC inducted the Chiefs of the PLAAF and PLAN as members of the CMC. Soon thereafter budgetary allocations saw a quantum leap in favour of the PLAAF and PLAN which presently receive about 29 per cent each as compared to only 19 per cent for the Army.
The Concept
The concept of IJO incorporates various types of units (ground, air, naval, missiles and logistics) and battlefield systems (Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic warfare) into operations while treating each element equally in planning and execution.2

PLA Soldiers in Military Drill

Military Regions (MRs) double up as War Zones in war. While the MR Commander is normally replaced, the staff may be replaced or augmented for the campaign. The War Zone Campaign (WZC) may be commanded by a member of the CMC.3 The organisation is required to be tailored to suit a particular campaign, which may comprise a number of sub campaigns air, counter-air, missile, electromagnetic and information warfare, etc., to name a few. The lead service commander becomes the sub-campaign commander under the War Zone Commander. Campaigns are all joint service operations with regular units, local units, militia and civil assets placed at the disposal of the War Zone Commander. According to Cortez Coopers testimony presented before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chinas existing MR structures are not capable of executing joint missions.4 The PLA is looking at developing a joint platform which can integrate all services seamlessly when executing a particular campaign but its organisation is still unclear.5 ! A WZC Co mmander is likely to be advised by the MR Commander(s), the MR Political Commissar, the MR AF Commander, MR PLAN Commander (where applicable), the MR Second Artillery Force (MR SAF) Commander and Deputy Commanders representing the General Staff Department, General Armament Department and the General Logistics Departments, besides the Commanders of the Group Armies placed under his command for the campaign.
While the organisation tree for the conduct of IJO at the campaign level is not available in the open domain, the responsibility to frame and suggest structures was given to the Nanjing Army Command Academy in the aftermath of US operations in Iraq in 2003. The responsibility included preparation of a doctrine, modular groupings at each level, integrated logistics, joint training and exercises and a strategic project to develop talented personnel in information technology.6 The Jinan MAC was made responsible for establishing the `theatre joint training leading group` in 2009 as the test bed to conduct, monitor and evaluate the IJO concept. The first joint exercise held was the `Vanguard 2009` (Qianfeng 2009) in October 2009 in Henan Province. 7The main participants were the armoured brigade of the 20th Group Army, the 1st Army Aviation Regiment, an element of the 15th Airborne Corps, and aircraft from units in the Guangzhou and Jinan MR Air Forces.8 This exercise looked at joint operations at the brigade level in which a brigade commander was given resources from 11 different services at his disposal.
A study of large scale exercises done by the PLA in 2009-10 provides some insights into the progress that the PLA has made in operationalising the IJO concept. The `Kuayue 2009`, a joint live firing exercise involving 50,000 troops, was conducted in 2009. It involved troops from four MRs - Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou, integrated with the PLAAF. The aim was to test ground and Airborne Troops (15 Airborne Army- Strategic reserves) in carrying out an assault under electromagnetic condition! s. The l ongest move was over 2400 kms and civilian aircraft and trains were requisitioned for the mobilisation for the exercise. In addition 90 per cent of the artillery and 50 per cent of the armour units participated. This exercise had four division size battle-groups from four different MRs,9 with support elements to test out different scenarios. The China Daily reported that the exercise intends to test `the PLA's capacity in command and decision-making, joint operations of land and air troops, operations in complicated electro-magnetic conditions, paratrooper assault operations, simulated battles, and comprehensive exercises by specialist units.`10 The participation of the Biedou satellite navigation and positioning system, new psychological warfare equipment, simulators and logistic elements called for a great deal of coordination at the War Zone level.