Security in space: The cluttered frontier
America updates its space-security policy
Security in space
THE high frontier. The final frontier, even. The metaphor is compelling, and American writers of both fact and fiction have not resisted it. Space is there to be exploited, just as the wide-open lands of the West were in the 19th century. Moreover, there are no pesky Mexicans to be defeated, nor inconvenient native inhabitants to be corralled into reservations before the exploitation can begin. True, there was a rival, in the shape of the Soviet Union. But that imploded two decades ago. They might be coming in peace, for all mankind, but Americans are clear that the development of the new, high, final frontier should be led by them, and no one else.
At least, they used to be. Unfortunately, it has not quite worked out like that. A strategy document* published on February 4th by the country’s Department of Defence (DOD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reveals interlopers. Around 60 countries now have satellites orbiting the Earth. Along with those satellites—which number more than 1,000—there are 22,000 man-made objects large enough to track by radar and hundreds of thousands of bits of debris too small to detect. Space is a congested, contested and competitive place, and one in which America is merely first among equals.
America’s new national security space strategy—the first the DOD has felt the need to publish—is an attempt to adapt to this reality. Satellites, vital for both military and economic security, face a range of threats, including accidental collisions, anti-satellite missiles, lasers, electronic jamming and even the hacking of their software. On top of that, America has a lot more competition than it used to in the markets for making and launching satellites. A decade ago its share of these industries was double what it is today.
The virtues of modesty
Such competition is inevitable, as space technology spreads and other countries are no longer forced to rely on America’s good offices for things like satellite-based global positioning systems. But a more direct threat to America’s position comes from the testing of anti-satellite weapons.
In 2007 the Chinese used one of their ageing weather satellites as target practice for a ground-based missile. The test was successful, in that the satellite was destroyed, and America had a minor “Sputnik moment” of realisation of the true capabilities of its rival. But the test also had the consequence of creating thousands of pieces of debris that now pose a hazard for other satellites, including Chinese ones.
The new strategy document suggests that, rather than trying to negotiate treaties that outlaw such behaviour, America should lead by example. To an extent, it already has. A year after the Chinese test, America followed suit. It destroyed an errant spy satellite that still had a full load of a toxic propellant called hydrazine, and was in danger of spilling it over an inhabited area when it re-entered the atmosphere.
Unlike the Chinese test, though, the American target was in such a low orbit that any debris would quickly have fallen into the air and burned up. There were claims at the time that this test was intended mainly as a demonstration to the Chinese. If it was, they may have learned a lesson in good neighbourliness, at least. According to Brian Weeden, of a think-tank called the Secure World Foundation, China conducted another anti-satellite test in 2010, and that passed without criticism. The crucial difference was that, like America’s test, the second Chinese one did not create any mess.
The strategy document also talks of improving “space situational awareness” which, translated into English, means that America should be willing to share intelligence, if that will help the rest of the world avoid collisions. Along with improvements to the country’s system of sensors for detecting objects in orbit, this intelligence might also come from data-sharing agreements with commercial satellite operators and other governments. According to Mr Weeden, such discussions are already happening.
That is a significant change of attitude. In the past, information about orbits was a closely guarded secret. Now, a degree of pragmatism is needed. There is little point in retaining a superior awareness of what is going on in space if this means watching debris build up to the point where your own satellites become unusable.
Another area of politically sensitive change described by the document is export control. It makes sense, of course, not to give your best secrets to your enemies. But it also makes sense not to have controls so onerous that your own companies cannot compete with foreign rivals. Not only does that reduce revenue, it also weakens the incentive to improve technology and lets those foreigners get ahead. And that is what has happened to America in recent years, as its satellite industry has been entangled in Gordian knots of red tape.
Change, though, is afoot—as the strategy document confirms. Peter Marquez, vice-president of strategy at Orbital Sciences Corporation, a private space-launch company, was once the National Security Council’s director for space policy. He says both the DOD strategy document and America’s broader space policy admit that the country has “a serious problem” with its space industry. Action needs to be taken, he says, to help aerospace companies succeed, both at home and abroad.
That sounds suspiciously like industrial policy. But when the government is an industry’s biggest consumer, it is unavoidable. Change is clearly needed, because government procurement practices have turned out to be harmful. As Mr Marquez puts it, “the government typically buys large, expensive space capabilities, which cost a great deal and take a long time to build. Long timelines lead to gaps in coverage, decreased abilities to insert new technologies, attrition in the workforce and a dwindling supply chain.” In other words, a vicious circle. The new strategy seeks to replace this with a virtuous circle, buying more specialised spacecraft on a reliable schedule.
But America will also have to recognise it no longer rules the roost. Mr Marquez reckons that American firms will increasingly have to work with foreigners. A new and modest view of space, indeed, from the country that brought you the Apollo programme. Globalisation, it seems, is now extraterrestrial, as well.
*“National Security Space Strategy”. Joint publication by the Department of Defence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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